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drowning after the plane was shot down and the life-boat machinegunned while the victim was still on the fuselage of the plane.3
M. K. D.
TAKING OF AUTOMOBILE BY CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF

AGE AS THEFT OF CAR WITHIN MEANING OF AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PoLIc.-The appellant brought an action on an automobile
insurance policy in which the coverage clause declared, "To pay for
any loss of or damage to the automobile, hereinafter called loss, except
loss sustained by collision of the automobile with another object or
by upset of the automobile or by collision of the automobile with a
vehicle to which it is attached. Breakage of glass and koss caused by
missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, explosion, earthquake, windstorm,
hail, water, flood, vandalism, riot or civil commotion shall not be
deemed loss caused by collision or upset." The appellant parked his
automobile on a hill facing downward, with the right front wheel
turned at an angle against the curb, the handbrake on, the gears engaged, the ignition locked, and the keys thereto in his personal possession and the car door unlocked. Without his knowledge or consent and in his absence a three and one-half year old child entered the
car and caused it to start down the hill. The car rolled with the child
in it, until it was stopped and damaged by colliding with another automobile which was parked at a curb. Held, reversed. The intentional
appropriation of property, to a use inconsistent with the property
rights of the person from whom it is taken, is theft within the neaw;ing of an insurance policy. Any unusual destruction wrought it the
doing of a wrongful act is vandalism. In all cases of loss, the loss
will be attributed to the proximate, not to the remote cause. Unkelsbee v. Homestead Insurance Co., 41 A. (2d) 168 (1945).
Two questions were presented on this appeal: Was the loss
attributable to theft or vandalism? Or, if not, was the loss caused
by collision? The court first considered the question of theft. In
support thereof it said that theft within the meaning of an insurance
policy did not require that an intention be shown either to deprive
the owner of the value of the property or to permanently deprive him
of the use of the property but merely the intentional appropriation of
property to a use inconsistent with the property rights of the person
from whom it is taken.' With reference to the conclusive presumption of the common law which is carried into our jurisprudence, that
a child under seven years of age is incapable of forming a criminal
Bull v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 141 F. (2d) 456 (1944).
' Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 73 App. D. C. 161, 117
F. (2d) 774, 776 (1941). Contra: Home Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Trammel,
3

230 Ala. 278, 160 So. 897 (1935) ; Fidelity and Guaranty Fire Corp. v. Ratterman, 262 Ky. 350, 90 S. W. (2d) 679 (1936); Kovero v. Hudson Insurance

Co. of N. Y., 192 Minn. 10, 255 N. W. 93 (1934).
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intent,2 the court said, "This arbitrary presumption may be regarded
more in the light of a shield against the penalty of the law, than an
obliteration of the offense. Here in the brief statement of agreed
facts, there is nothing from which we may infer a specific intent to
deprive the owner of the automobile of his property rights. Judicial
notice may hardly be extended to supply such an element in the mental processes of a child of such tender years." Thus the court definitely implied that if there were facts in this case which showed an
intent on the part of the child to deprive the owner of his property
rights, it would have disregarded the conclusive presumption of law.
Having no precedent of a judicial interpretation of vandalism to
navigate by, the court invoked two rules applicable to construing
policies of insurance. First, a contract of insurance is to be construed
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.3
Second, the words used in a policy should be given their common,
ordinary or popular meanings, rather than the meanings of lexicographers or those skilled in the niceties of language. 4 Then the court
said, to the popular mind any unusual destructionwrought in the doing
of a wrongful act nerits the title vandalism.5 The wrongful acts of
the child in tampering with the mechanisms of the automobile were
acts of vandalism. In considering collision as the cause of the loss,
the court said, unless qualifying words appear such as direct, direct
or indirect, sole, etc., a loss will be attributed to the proximate, not
to the remote cause. 6 The proximate cause is the efficient cause,
that which necessarily sets the others in operation. The causes that
are merely incidental to or instruments of a superior or controlling
agency are not the proximate cause and the responsible cause, though
they may be nearer in time to the result.7 The loss in this case can
only be attributed to the acts of the child plus the laws of gravity.
Those acts were the proximate cause of the loss. Nor can it be successfully contended that the company intended to limits its liability
to those specific instances recited in the coverage clause as causes of
loss not to be deemed loss caused by collision. Had the company so
intended, it should have used more apt language. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is an aid to construction, not a rule
of law. It is not to be arbitrarily applied. Here the acts of the
2 Allen v. United States, 150 U. S. 551, 558, 37 L. ed. 1179, 14 Sup. Ct.
196 (1893); State v. Smith, 213 N. C. 299, 195 S. E. 819 (1938).
3 Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Co. v. Kearny, 180 U. S. 132,

45 L. ed. 460, 21 Sup. Ct. 326 (1901); Aschenbrenner v. U. S. Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 292 U. S. 80, 78 L. ed. 137, 54 Sup. Ct. 590 (1934).
4 Aschenbrenner v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., supra.
5 New Century Dictionary defines vandalism as: "Wilful or ignorant destruction of artistic treasures; hostility to or contempt for what is beautiful
or venerable"; see Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary.
6 Tracy v. Palmetto Fire Insurance Co., 207 Iowa 1042, 222 N. W. 447
(1928); Ploe v. International Indemnity Corp., 128 Wash. 480, 223 Pac. 327

(1924).
7 Aetna Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117, 130, 24 L. ed. 395 (1877).
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infant were not excluded, but were included, in the coverage clause
and his acts were the proximate cause of the loss.

I. K.
MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT

FOR WANT

OF UNDERSTANDING-

DOES IT INCLUDE LUNACY AS WELL AS IDIOCY?-An action was

brought under Section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law 1 and Section
1137 of the Civil Practice Act 2 to annul a marriage on the ground
of the plaintiff's lunacy. The jury was asked to determine whether
the plaintiff was a lunatic at the time of his marriage. The defendant's counsel wished the court to charge that if the jury found that
the plaintiff had a lucid interval on the day of the marriage, the
a3swer to the question must be "No". The court refused the request.
The trial court charged the jury that, "A lunatic is a person of unsound mind who is mentally deranged but might have intermittant
lucid intervals." After the jury had retired, it returned with a request for further instructions. The court once again refused the
counsel's request that it charge the jury, "A lunatic meant that plaintiff on the day of the marriage was incapable of consenting thereto
for want of understanding." 3 Held, refusal to charge as requested
was prejudicial error. De Nardo v. De Nardo, 293 N. Y. 550
(1944).
In New York, a marriage may be annulled where one of the
parties, due to his mental derangement at the time of marriage, was
incapable of comprehending the nature and import of the act. 4 Although this rule would seem, on the face of it, to offer no decisional
'Dom. REL. LAW § 7: A marriage is void from the time its nullity is
declared by a court of competent jurisdiction if either party thereto:
Subd. 2: Was incapable of consenting to the marriage for want of understanding.
2 Cu'. PRAC. Acr § 1137: Action to annul marriage where party was a
lunatic. An action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties
thereto was a lunatic may be maintained at any time during the continuance
of the lunacy or, after the death of the lunatic in that condition and during the
life of the other party to the marriage, by any relative of the lunatic who has
an interest to avoid the marriage. Such an action may also be maintained by
the lunatic at any time after restoration to sound mind; but in that case the
marriage should not be annulled if it appears that the parties freely cohabited
as husband and wife after the lunatic was restored to a sound mind. Where
one of the parties to a marriage was a lunatic at the time of the marriage an
action may also be maintained by the other party at any time during the continuance of the lunacy, provided the plaintiff did not know of the lunacy at
the time of the marriage. An action to annul a marriage upon the ground
specified by subdivision 5 of section 7 of the Domestic Relations Law may be
maintained pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of such subdivision by or on behalf of either of the parties to such marriage.
3 Dom. REL. LAW § 7, cited supra note 1.
4 Weinberg v. Weinberg, 255 App. Div. 366 (4th Dep't 1938).

